As
the political arena in Iraq returned to a degree of normality post-ISIS, Iraqi
Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi took advantage of this opportunity to issue a
10-point statement announcing his decision to integrate the Iranian Militias in
Iraq and Syria into the regular Iraqi army. According to this new policy, IMIS
will be subject to the same regulations as the army. This decision came in
light of IMIS’s activities outside the framework of the state, which have
caused problems leading to adverse effects — in particular, IMIS’s sectarian
orientations and its policy of settling scores with its foes and rivals
violently and without due process.
Another
important factor behind this decision is IMIS’s proximity and strong ties with
the Iranian regime. Iran exploited the call by Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in 2014
for able-bodied Iraqi Shiites to take up arms against ISIS, with Tehran taking
full advantage to serve its own agenda in Iraq and Syria. For Iran’s regime, IMIS is an influential military and security force, as well as an aggressive
unit within what it calls the “Axis of Resistance,” which aims to curb regional
and international actors, particularly their influence in the region, and to
implement Iran’s expansionist agenda in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.
Despite
the reasons behind this decision, Iraqi lawmaker Karim Allawi, a member of the
Iraqi Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee, believes that the number of IMIS
affiliates will now increase. He added that the number of IMIS militiamen will
not be scaled down in any case. Allawi further believes that Faleh al-Fayyad
will remain responsible for IMIS and will continue to run it as a separate
entity, as is the case with the ministries of defense and interior, among
others.
But
what is the real aim of the Iraqi government in making this decision? The message
is clear: In light of rapid regional developments, the Iraqi prime minister is
aiming to spare his country from being embroiled in a US-Gulf-Iran conflict.
This is proven by the timing of the decision, which came in the aftermath of
reports mentioning how the drones that hit Aramco facilities in central Saudi
Arabia flew from Iraqi territory. Also, it appears that armed groups such as IMIS
are rebelling against the Iraqi state and have integrated terrorist
organizations into their structures, which have carried out revenge attacks
inside Iraq, especially against Sunnis, as well as killing, robbing and
displacing tens of thousands of civilians. Another aim that may have prompted
the prime minister’s decision is his wish to eliminate all non-state militias
and to ensure arms are under the exclusive control of the Iraqi state by
getting rid of all armed wings affiliated with political parties in the
country.
There
are many points regarding this decision that require attention and study,
leading many to question the wisdom of Abd al-Mahdi’s call and of his ability
to implement this policy. Firstly, what will be the fate of the various
economic sectors, investments and construction firms owned and controlled by
the different militias under IMIS’s umbrella, especially in Baghdad and other
areas under their control? In the event of the prime minister’s decision being
executed, would these areas continue to be controlled by IMIS or be handed over
to the Iraqi state? While it is a positive move that the decision stipulates
the closure of economic offices belonging to IMIS, it does not, however,
address the fate of the massive assets and funds it controls.
Secondly,
the prime minister’s decision seems to indicate that IMIS will maintain its
autonomy without being fully integrated into the armed forces of Iraq. This is
positive for IMIS, as it provides it with a cloak of legitimacy and allows it
to independently form its own structures and appoint its senior leadership.
This will be done under the umbrella of a newly created body named the IMIS
Authority. IMIS will maintain its position against the political administration
of the country because it considers itself to be much more important and senior
than the country’s leadership. The sacrifices IMIS has made ensure that its
fate can only be decided by the top religious authority, whether in Iraq or
Iran.
Thirdly,
and this is the most important, many fear that the prime minister’s decision
paves the way for establishing an Iraqi entity based on the model of the
Iranian regime’s Revolutionary Guard Corps. In time, this will enable IMIS to
acquire all the advanced weapons, jets, tanks and missiles it requires for
military training, while retaining its true identity as an organization shaped
by an extremist sectarian ideology that guides and determines it affiliations,
orientations and actions. Given the fears over IMIS reaching this stage, it
may, therefore, be necessary for Iraq’s government to consider these fears and
to work, from an organizational, administrative and strategic aspect, to ensure
the full integration of IMIS into the regular army. It may also need to
rehabilitate IMIS’s affiliates in order to change their current extremist
ideological and sectarian perspectives and their loyalties to certain figures,
including leaders outside Iraq. This will ensure that they pledge their loyalty
to the Iraqi state, serving all its religious, sectarian and ethnic groups.
In
conclusion, the upcoming period will be a serious test for Abd al-Mahdi, not
only in implementing his decision on IMIS, but also in finding and fixing the
gaps in his policy to guarantee Iraq pushes itself far away from the evils of
ethnic-sectarian quotas for ministries, as well as establishing a cohesive
nation state that can stand up to domestic and external pressures. This must be
in addition to ensuring that his decision is not exploited and directed in a
malign way toward objectives that will result in chaos and sectarian strife
returning to Iraq once again.
