After the Syrian war erupted in 2011, and after much
bewilderment, US policymakers eventually realized the necessity of removing
Bashar al-Assad from office and settled on the policy of regime change.
The calculation was that Assad had far too much blood on his hands and will simply not be tenable to the majority of Syrians in any post-war peace agreement. Though President Obama made this policy clear on multiple occasions, he did almost next to nothing to ensure it came to pass.
In fact, historians will argue how Obama’s policy did the polar opposite and consolidated Assad’s position by explicitly leaving a vacuum by not enforcing his own red lines which was then filled by Iran and Russia thus safeguarding the dictator’s presidency.
It should therefore come as now surprise then that the US has now formally completely reversed its position and is no longer calling for the removal of Bashar al-Assad. On Thursday, US Special Representative to Syria, Ambassador James Jeffrey told the House Foreign Affairs Committee that US policy in Syria is “not regime change.”
So as Assad hears these pleasing words he will likely be planning his post-war reign. His first priority must be to ensure that such an uprising can never happen again. That means making an example of everyone who opposed him. There is every reason to expect that the retribution will be just as brutal as the conflict itself.
What may soon be forgotten among the endless reports and discussions on post-war reconstruction is why this conflict started seven years ago. President Assad, like his father before him, presided over a Baathist regime that was as repressive as anything in Eastern Europe during the Cold War, or Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
Whoever was thought to be an “enemy of the state” would be routinely rounded up, imprisoned and tortured. And if any of them resisted being “re-educated”, they would eventually be simply killed.
Heady days of Arab Spring
It was against this kind of government that people rose up in Syria during the heady days of the Arab Spring. And what was interesting in those early days is that even though the government was dominated by the Alawite Shia sect, the uprising was not originally sectarian.
The uprising was a coming together of virtually all elements of Syrian society, including many dissidents from the Syrian Army and other political insiders. It was only later that the conflict took a decidedly sectarian character when ISIS appeared on the scene, and Iranian militias and Hezbollah also joined the fray.
And if that was the Assad government then, we can only imagine what it will be like after it has been hardened by seven years of bitter, sectarian Civil War. Or perhaps not much imagination is required at all.
After all, we have seen the government’s attitude towards civilians throughout this conflict, in their use of chemical weapons against their own people, cluster munitions, systematic bombing of hospitals and other humanitarian relief agencies, and widespread use of starvation siege tactics.
In other words, even as the rebels might finally succumb and “peace” will be declared, we have every reason to expect that Assad’s government will continue to wage war against the civilian populations who supported the rebellion to punish them. That war may not be as visible as the constant shelling of hospitals in urban centers, but it will be every bit as real as the networks of secret police prisons from before the war.
What is more, we must not neglect the role of Assad’s allies in this conflict, like Iran and Russia. Russia in particular has benefited immensely from the instability caused by the refugee flow out of Syria and into Turkey and Europe. Even as Putin may want the conflict to settle down so he can wind down his military involvement to keep down costs, he has every reason to want the refugee flow into Europe to continue.
So both Assad and his key ally, Putin, have every interest to keep Syria a humanitarian hell and hopefully displace as many opponents of the regime from the country, while none of their allies are adversely affected by this – with the possible exception of Lebanon which is, in any case, a client state of Syria and does not get to have much of say in the matter.
And, let us not forget, they are the two players that have the greatest amount of control over the outcome of the conflict. So long as that remains the case, and both their respective interests would be best served by continuing the abuse of the Syrian people, there is no reason to believe that the humanitarian crisis is going to get any better.