Tehran prefers to strike directly only at weak and
peripheral enemies, while acting against stronger ones through proxies. Is this
distinction sustainable?
The effort by the US and its allies to contain and
ultimately roll back the gains made by Iran in the region over the last half
decade is currently taking shape, and is set to form the central strategic
process in the Middle East in the period now opening up. New sanctions in the export of Iranian oil
are due to be implemented from November 4th. Israel’s campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria is the most
important current file on the table of the defense establishment. The US appears set now to maintain its assets
and its allies in Syria as part of the emergent strategy to counter Iran. In Iraq, the contest between Iran-associated
forces and those associated with the US is the core dynamic in the country,
with the independent power on the ground of the Iran-associated Shia militias
the central factor. In Yemen, the battle
of attrition between the Iran supported Ansar Allah (Houthis) and the Saudi and
UAE-led coalition is continuing, with limited but significant gains by the
latter.
Iran’s response is also becoming clear. At the present time, Tehran’s ballistic
missile capabilities appear to be the preferred instrument for Tehran to
express its defiance.
Notably, for the moment at least, Iran appears to be erring
in the side of caution in its choice of targets. This phase is unlikely to last, however,
assuming the US is serious in its intentions.
In the early hours of Monday, October 1st, the Fars News
Agency, associated with the Revolutionary Guards, reported that the IRGC had
fired a number of Zulfiqar and Qiyam ballistic missiles at targets east of the
Euphrates river in Syria. The strike came
in response to an attack on an IRGC
parade in Iran’s Arab majority Khuzestan province on September 22nd.
According to Fars, the missiles fired were decorated with
slogans including ‘Death to America,’ ‘Death to Israel,’ and ‘death to Al
Saud’.
It is noteworthy, however, that the missiles were not
directed at any of the aforementioned enemies of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Rather, the IRGC targeted the
Hajin pocket, a small enclave east of the Euphrates still held by the Islamic
State. This was in response to a claim
of responsibility by IS for the September 22 attack. (A somewhat more credible claim was made by
the Ahwaziya, or Ahvaz national resistance, an Arab separatist group in
Khuzestan). Iranian Supreme National
Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani later tried to frame the attack as a
response to American threats, because of the close proximity of the US-backed
Syrian Democratic Forces to the area targeted.
Similarly, on September 8th, the IRGC fired 7 Fateh-110
short range missiles at a base maintained by the PDKI (Democratic Party of
Iranian Kurdistan) in the city of Koya in eastern Iraq. The PDKI is engaged in an insurgency against
the IGC and the Iranian regime, centered on the Kordestan Province of western
Iran. 11 people were killed in the
attack.
In both these cases, Tehran chose to make its
demonstrations of strength against the very weakest of the forces opposed to it
(in the case of Islamic State, a force indeed mainly itself engaged against the
enemies of Iran). Shamkhani’s bluster
after the fact tends to draw attention to this, rather than detract from it.
By contrast, when Iran wishes to act against or threaten the
interests of any of the powerful states whose names were written on the
missiles fired at IS in Hajin, it takes care to do so in ways that avoid
attribution. Thus, the Lebanese
Hizballah organization, in military terms a direct tributary of the IRGC, is
the force entrusted with the missile array facing Israel.
When ballistic missiles are fired at Riyadh from Yemen, the
act is claimed by the Houthis, and the missiles are identified as ‘Burkan 1’
and ‘Burkan 2’ missiles, developed in Yemen. These missiles are considered by the US State Department and senior US
officers to be Iranian in origin, possibly the Qiam 1 or Shihab 2 system with
minor modifications. Certainly, the
Houthis, a lightly armed north Yemeni tribal militia, did not acquire the
knowledge required to operate ballistic missiles locally. There is evidence to suggest that Lebanese
Hezballah operatives are engaged by Iran in Yemen to carry out these launches.
In Iraq, according to a Reuters report in August, the IRGC
has begun to transfer ballistic missiles to its militia proxies in that
country, presumably with the intention of using these against Israeli or US
personnel.
So Iran acts through deniable proxies in its wars against
powerful states, but acts directly only against small and marginal non-state
paramilitary groups. The purpose, of
course, is to enable the Iranian state to avoid retribution, while gaining benefit
from the acts of the militias.
This practice has proven effective in recent years, though
it projects weakness as much as strength. It is of use only for as long as Iran’s enemies are willing to
participate in the fiction of separation between the IRGC and its client
militias.
At a certain point, if the US and its allies are serious
about rolling back Iran from its regional gains, the question will arise as to
whether success in this endeavor can co-exist with the tacit agreement to
maintain this fiction. In Israel’s case,
the decision to cease adherence to this convention was taken earlier this year,
when Israeli aircraft began openly targeting Iranian facilities in Syria.
For the US, such a decision is likely to emerge, if it
emerges, as a result of the dynamics set in motion by the decision to challenge
Iran’s advances. At the moment, what is
taking place is something of a ‘phoney war:’ missile strikes against peripheral
targets, grandiose threats from the IRGC leadership, supplying of militias with
that or that weapon system.
If Tehran begins to feel that its interests are truly
threatened, however, this period is likely to come to an end. When it does so, Tehran is likely to seek to
hit at the US at its most vulnerable points – the US forces and official facilities in Iraq and Syria. Such actions will almost certainly be taken
not by the IRGC itself, but rather by this or that proxy set of initials. It may come through the use of missiles, or
by a variety of other means.
At this point, the US will need to decide whether retribution
will be inflicted only on the proxies, or on those sending them. The pattern of Iran’s behavior suggests a
great sensitivity toward not including Iranian personnel within the sphere of
conflict. This is a vulnerability that
should be exploited. The success or the frustration of the effort to turn back
Iran’s advance across the region may thus depend on the decision taken as and when Iran chooses to end the current
‘phoney war.’
