The first attack resulted in the death of an Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, Abu Alfazl Sarabian, and several Hezbollah and militias soldiers. The Iraqis were not sure about the source of the attack while the Iranians considered the IRGC commander a martyr. From Iran’s side, it would make sense to use the militias to deploy missiles in Iraq; this would increase Tehran’s area of operations and enable it to transport missiles to Syria and Lebanon. Its inventory of ballistic missiles could put Riyadh—or even Tel Aviv—within range if launched from Iraqi territory.
The other attack followed and targeted Camp Ashraf in Diyala governorate, which was once used by the Mujahedin-e-Khalq, an organization opposed to the Iranian regime. The base is closer to the Iranian border, making it essential for the IRGC’s operations. It was interesting that these strikes came less than two weeks after Prime Minister Abdul-Mahdi ordered the militias to be integrated entirely into the Iraqi security forces, a step seen as lessening Iranian influence in the country. Soon after the issuance of Abdul-Mahdi’s decree, many militias factions like Kataeb Hezbollah slammed it and attributed the policy to the result of US and Saudi pressure. Other IMIS factions, including those close to Iraqi Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani such as the Abbas Combat Division, were obedient and quiet, following the orders of the prime minister—as the commander in chief of the armed forces—without resistance.
An attack on August 14 against a weapons depot in Baghdad was also blamed on Israel. An Israeli imaging firm confirmed that the attack on an IMIS camp south of Baghdad was carried out by Israeli aircraft; it supported this claim by producing images of the attack. The Iraqi government has remained silent and has not referred to Israel as the responsible party. In fact, most of the government’s statements were verbal and did not hold anyone directly accountable. This clearly exposes the volatile and enfeebled state of the Iraqi government.
The Iraqi prime minister is weak as regards Iranian interests; he has neither the power nor the will to act in more aggressive and vigorous ways. This is perhaps due to his hidden connections with Iranian influence circles inside the Iraqi government or simply because he lacks support from the political and security sectors.
Still, the attacks indicate that Israel is looking to widen its theater of confrontation with Iran to an unwitting Iraq that continues to suffer from foreign interference. Such an Israeli attempt appears to be conducted under the watchful–perhaps colluding–eye of the Trump Administration, which considers itself to be an important player in Iraqi politics.