The leader of Iraq’s second largest party, Hadi al-Amiri,
called on foreign forces to leave Iraq over the weekend. Slamming US President
Donald Trump’s visit, in which Trump did not meet Iraqi officials, he intimated
that the US should also draw down its forces. This comes at the same time as
Maj.-Gen. Tamir Hayman, head of Israel’s military intelligence, warned at a
conference in Tel Aviv that Iraq is under growing influence of Iran.
Iran’s role in Iraq is multi-layered. It suffered a slight
setback in the elections in 2018 as Muqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite cleric and Iraqi
nationalist, came in first. Amiri, leading a party supported by former and
current Shiite militias, some of them closely connected to Iran, came in
second.
Iran’s influence may have peaked under former Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki, who was the most powerful man in Iraq from 2006 to 2014.
Maliki not only presided over the period when US troops left but, according to
former officials, the US under the Obama administration saw him as a strongman
who would help lead Iraq as the US presence diminished. Oddly, even as the US
saw him as helping preserve Iraq, he railed against the Americans. In
Washington’s calculations at the time this was acceptable because a certain
amount of populist anti-Americanism nevertheless meant Iraq would be unified
under one leader, rather than sink into instability and allow a place for
extremism to grow.
Instead, the opposite happened. Maliki’s authoritarianism
alienated the Sunni minority and the Kurdish region. ISIS and its genocidal
extremism entered the vacuum created in Sunni areas by Maliki’s thuggish
bureaucracy. After ISIS took over a third of Iraq and he was forced out in
Baghdad, Maliki claimed that the Obama administration was “behind the creation
of ISIS in order to bring down the government.” Nothing could be further from
the truth, but blaming America was the easiest way to excuse Baghdad’s
problems.
These were the kind of conspiracy theories and anti-American
rhetoric that were common among segments of the pro-Iranian leadership angling
to run Iraq. Under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who replaced Maliki in 2014,
Iraq had to have a kind of Janus face when it came to the US and Iran. The US
would help train Iraq’s army and carry out airstrikes, but the rank and file of
anti-ISIS fighters would often be more sympathetic to Iran, some even carried
photos of Ayatollah Khamenei with them into battle. Khamenei even warned
against Iraq allowing the US to return and aid its fight.
To fight ISIS, the Iraqi government also partnered with tens
of thousands of Shiite militias that cropped up after a 2014 fatwa against
ISIS. This was the natural response to the ISIS threat. ISIS was massacring
people across Iraq and Iraq’s army was disintegrating. Militias, imbued with
religious zeal and often looking to Iran’s Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
for inspiration, helped defeat ISIS. Some of these were extremely hostile to
the US.
Groups like Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq were even led by men like Qais
Khazali, who had been detained by the US. Hezbollah Brigades leader Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis had been sanctioned by the US Treasury in 2009. He was close to
IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani.
Men like Muhandis, Khazali and Amiri were also influential
in 2009 and 2015. Amiri’s Badr Organization runs the interior ministry of Iraq
and funnels its resources to former Shiite militia members. The Shiite militias
were even rebranded as the “Popular Mobilization Units” and made an official
paramilitary force, like the IRGC or Basij in Iran.
This is the Iranification of Iraq and it has gone on slowly
for more than a decade. The pro-Iranian factions have always been close to
power in Iraq since 2003. One of the necessary blind spots of US policy, and by
extension other Western governments, is to pretend that these pro-Iranian
individuals, some of them former militants or violent extremists, do not make
up the rank and file of individuals close to power in Baghdad. It’s also
unsurprising they have such influence. They resisted Saddam Hussein, with many
of those like Amiri going to Iran in the 1980s to fight against Saddam
alongside the Iranians.
To create an illusion of an Iraqi government that is not
entirely an ally of Iran, the US has sought to encourage Baghdad to reach out
to Saudi Arabia and sought to push for more Gulf investment in Iraq. In 2017,
Iraq and Saudi Arabia began to improve relations after decades in which they
had been broken after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
The US has sought to balance relations with Baghdad with its
outreach to Sunni areas of Iraq and also the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG). The KRG has been staunchly pro-Western over the years, an island of
stability in an Iraq that has suffered terribly.
Yet, the US relationship with the Kurdish region was
strained in 2017 when the KRG had an independence referendum. The US worked
with Baghdad and supported Baghdad sending tanks into Kirkuk, along with
Iranian-backed Shiite militias, to punish the Kurdish region. Kurdish Peshmerga
had defended Kirkuk from ISIS from 2014 to 2017.
With the war over, Washington thought the KRG could be
pushed aside in favor of a Baghdad strategy. This strategy hasn’t reduced
Iran’s role or presence. This is not because Iran is necessarily playing a
greater role.
In fact, there is evidence that many Iraqis are tired of
Iran. In protests in Basra, people have attacked the headquarters of various
Iranian-linked militias. They think Iran is partly responsible for economic problems,
as Iraq’s resources are plundered by Iranians. As sanctions kick in, Iran has
even more reason to plunder Iraq for its economic interests. Iraqis also
complain that there is a drug trade from Iran. Some of these claims are
exaggerated, but there are serious questions about the degree to which Iran
sees part of Iraq as a “near abroad,” a kind of colony that it can dump its
products on. Is the relationship equal or does Iraq do the work for Iran?
Now the US once again faces questions about whether it will
remain in Iraq. From the point of view of those who are concerned about Iran’s
role in the region and its attempt to create a “land corridor” to the sea via
Iraq and Syria, the US role is unclear. Do US forces help block Iranian
influence? So far they haven’t. Trump said that US forces in Iraq will continue
to fight ISIS and keep an eye on Iran. But Iran is also keeping an eye on US
forces.
There are many concerns in Iraq about the role of Iran. This
is not a simple discussion. Some Shiite parties and politicians oppose Iran’s
assertive role. Kurds and Sunnis are concerned. Those sponsoring reconstruction
are concerned. The US Defense Department has also listed numerous concerns
about threats from Iranian backed forces in Iraq. The US Congress has even
sought to sanction individual militias so that US aid in Iraq, or training,
does not benefit them.
But Washington has a problem. It has thought that investing
in a strong central government in Baghdad would reduce Iran’s role. That has
not happened yet - instead US investment may have inadvertently benefited Iran.
The US is also concerned about showing too much support for the Kurdish region,
thinking that it has to balance Baghdad and Erbil in the Kurdish region, as
opposed to simply embracing its allies in northern Iraq.
With Trump signaling a reduced influence in the Middle East,
it appears the only country that seeks to step into that vacuum so far is Iran.
Unless the Gulf states step up or others, the only beneficiary will be Iran.
Whether that represents growing influence or whether Iran has already reached a
peak of influence remains to be seen.
